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Helbush: Immigration Law

IMMIGRATION LAW
I. INS VIOLATIONS OF ITS OWN REGULATIONS:
RELIEF FOR THE ALIEN

Terry Helbush*
In recent years, the Ninth Circuit has indicated it is receptive to arguments by aliens that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) has not followed proper procedures
in deciding their cases. Increasingly, the Ninth Circuit has been
willing to grant relief to an alien in cases in which the Service
violates a regulation or imposes additional burdens not found in
the statute or regulation. This Article will discuss in detail three
recent Ninth Circuit decisions exemplifying this trend and suggest how these cases may be used and expanded in the future.

A. Tejeda-Mata v. INS: FAILURE TO FOLLOW INS REGULATIONS
APPLIED IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
In Tejeda-Mata v. INS,1 the Ninth Circuit for the first time
directly applied the rationale of United States v. Calderon-Medina l and United States v. Rangel-Gonzales' to deportation
proceedings. In the latter two cases, the Ninth Circuit found
that aliens who face prosecution for illegal entry after deportation may raise as a defense the Service's failure to follow its own
regulations in effecting their deportation, thereby rendering
their deportation invalid.· In Tejeda-Mata, the court applied
the same defense in a deportation proceeding itself. II
• Member of the California Bar; B.A., 1967, University of California, Santa Barbara;
J.D., 1976, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Bartels, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Choy and Ferguson, J.J.).
2. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
3. 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
4. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 533; United States v. CalderonMedina, 591 F.2d at 531.
5. In Tejeda-Mota, however, the court found that because the alien had not raised
the defense in the deportation proceedings below, he was precluded from raising it on a
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The Calderon-Medina court instituted a two-pronged test:
The regulation in question must benefit the alien, and the Service violation must have prejudiced interests of the alien which
the regulation protects.' The regulation in question in all three
cases requires the Service to communicate with consular or diplomatic officials upon detaining nationals of certain countries."
The Service did not notify the Consul of Mexico in any of these
cases even though the aliens were Mexican nationals, and Mexico and the United States maintained a treaty calling for immediate notification.
The rationale behind Calderon-Medina itself and behind
applying it in the deportation context is much the same as that
in traditional estoppel cases:,,·1 The Service should not profit
from its own procedural irregularities.' The theory of CalderonMedina, however, potentially has greater reach when applied to
deportation proceedings because it is not tied to a finding of affirmative misconduct."1 In other words, it does not depend on
some kind of "fault" or "intent" which affirmative misconduct
seems to connote.'
In addition, the Calderon-Medina theory, as applied to deportation actions through Tejeda-Mota, could have a wide application in immigration proceedings because it specifically is
not tied to the due process clause. Although previous immigration cases have found that the Service's failure to follow its own
regulations may render a proceeding unfair,IO Calderon-Medina
petition for review. 626 F.2d at 726.
6. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 532.
7. 8 C.P.R. § 242.2(e) (1980). Section 242.2(e) provides:
Priuilege of Communication. Every detained alien shall
be notified that he may communicate with the coDllular or diplomatic officera or the country or his nationality in the United
States. Existing treaties require immediate communication
with appropriate consular or diplomatic officera whenever nationals of the following countries are detained in exclusion of
expulsion proceedings, whether or not requested by the alien,
and, in fact, even if the alien request. that no communication
be undertaken in his behalf . . . .
Mexico is one of the enumerated countries.
7.1 See, e.g., Comeil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1976).
S. See United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 531.
S.l INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
9. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
10. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945).
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did not rely on the due process clause in reaching its result. In
Calderon-Medina, the court carefully pointed out that the Service's failure to follow a regulation-even when the violation in
question was not of such a degree as to render the proceeding
unfair-could invalidate a deportation proceeding. l l Thus, the
Calderon-Medina theory may be raised as an alternate or complementary theory when an alien complains of procedural irregularities in deportation proceedings.
Matter of Garcia-Flores,12 a Board of Immigration Appeals
case, illustrates the usefulness of the Calderon-Medina theory in
defending against deportation even when a defense based on a
due process argument undoubtedly would have failed. The alien
in Garcia-Flores complained that prior to giving a statement to
an immigration officer she was not advised of her right to counsel.18 She therefore argued that the evidence presented against
her at the hearing was inadmissible because it all resulted from
questioning by the immigration officer. Any argument that the
evidence should be excluded under the fourth amendment would
have failed because the Board of Immigration Appeals has held
that the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation pro11. 591 F.2d at 531.
12. I. & N. Dec. No. 2780 (Feb. 27, 1980).
13. Section 287.3 then provided in part:
An alien arrested without a warrant of arrest under the
authority contained in section 287(a)(2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act shall be examined as therein provided by
an officer other than the arresting officer, unless no other qual·
ified officer is readily available and the taking of the alien
before another officer would entail unnecessary delay, in which
event the arresting officer, if the conduct of such examination
is a part of the duties assigned to him, may examine the
alien. . . . If the examining officer is satisfied that there is
prima facie evidence establishing that the arrested alien is in
the United States in violation of the immigration laws, further
action in the case shall be taken as provided in Part 242 of
this chapter. An alien arrested without warrant of arrest shall
be advised of the reason of his own arrest and his right to be
represented by counsel of his own choice, at no expense to the
Government. . . . He shall also be advised that any statement
he makes may be used against him in a subsequent proceeding
and that a decision will be made within 24 hours or less as to
whether he will be continued in custody or released on bond
or recognizance.
8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1977).
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ceedings. 14 Although she could have maintained that her sta~
ments to the immigration officer were involuntary because she
was not advised of her right to counsel, 111 that would have been a
difficult argument given the standard of voluntariness and the
facts in her case. The Board, however, remanded her case to the
immigration judge under the authority of Calderon-Medina for
a finding as to whether the failure to advise her of the right to
c9unsel was prejudicial.
While Garcia-Flores, Tejeda-Mata and the previous cases
involved violations of regulations directly related to the apprehension of aliens, their detention and deportation hearing procedures, nothing in any of the cases indicated that the theory
should be limited to cover only violations of those kinds of regulations. Presumably, the theory would also encompass violations
of regulations relating, for instance, to the filing and adjudication of applications for benefits under the immigration law, if
prejudice could be shown. For this reason also, CalderonMedina and Tejeda-Mata will undoubtedly have a far-reaching
effect.

B. Patel v. INS

AND Bahat
MAKING AND NOTICE

v. Sureck:

ADJUDICATORY

RULE-

Patel v. INSl. and Bahat v. Sureck l7 involved similar fact
situations. Both Patel and Babat applied for permanent resident
status on the basis of investments in the United States.I I Both
14. Matter of Sandoval, I. & N. Dec. No. 2725 (Aug. 20, 1979).
15. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (lat Cir. 1977); Matter of Garcia, I. & N. Dec.
No. 2778 (Feb. 20, 1980).
16. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Skopil, J. and Markety, C.J., sittiDa by designation).
17. 637 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Boochever, J.; the other panel members were
Hug, J. and Richey, D.J., sitting by designation).
18. Both BOught residency under the nonpreference category, arguing that they were
exempt from the labor certification requirement of § 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976), because they fen within the business investor exception established by regulation in 1967 (8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1967». Section 212(a)(14) provides that potential immigrants are excludable from the United States
if they are:
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose
of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary
of Labor baa determined and certified to the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of aliens who are members of the teaching pro-
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sought to qualify for permanent residence under a 1973 regulation governing business investors. That regulation required that
in order to qualify for permanent residence as a business investor an alien must establish
that he is seeking to enter the United States for
the purpose of engaging in a commercial or agricultural enterprise in which he has invested, or is
actively in the proce88 of investing capital totaling
at least $10,000, and who establishes that he has
at least 1 year's experience or training qualifying
him to engage in such an enterprise.II

Although Patel and Bahat met the regulation requirements, the
Service denied their applications for permanent residence because they failed to satisfy a third requirement-that the investment "must tend to expand job opportunities and thus offset
any adverse impact which the alien's employment may have on
the market for jobs."'O
This third requirement was enunciated in Matter of
Heitland,1I a Board of Immigration Appeals case in which an
investor applied for permanent residence under the 1967 versioD
of the regulation governing business investors.U Although the
earlier regulation required only that the investor "had invested a
substantial amount of capital,"·' the Board found that to insure
fession or who have exceptional ability in the sciences or the
arts), and available at the time of application for a visa and
admission to the United States and at the place where the
alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor and (B) the
employment of such aliens will not adversely dect the wages
and working conditions of the workers in the United States
similarly employed.
8 U.S.C. § 1~82(a)(14) (1976).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1973).
20. Matter of Heitland, 14 I. & N. Dec. 563, 567 (1974), aff'd, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.),
cen. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977), quoted in Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d at 1202.
21. 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (1974), aff'd, 551 F.2d 459 (2d. Cu.), cen. denied, 434 U.s.
819 (1977).
22. The 1967 version of § 212.8(b)(4) provided in relevant part:
The following persons are not considered to be within the
purview of section 212(a)(14) of the Act and do not require
labor certification: ... (4) an alien who will engage in a commercial or agricultural enterprise in which he had invested or
is actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of
capital.
8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1967).

23.Id.
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that the investor alien's primary function would not be to perform skilled or unskilled labor, the investment should also tend
to expand job opportunities.14
In Heitland, the Board indicated that it would apply the
. "job-creation criterion"lIJ to cases arising under the 1973 version
of code section 212.8(b)(4)18 as well, and did so in Matter of
Ruangswang.17 Thus, the Board's decisions in Bahat and Patel
relied on both Heitland and Ruangswang.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's decisions in Bahat
and Patel on two grounds: (1) the dictum in the 1973 Heitland
decision gave inadequate notice to Bahat and Patel that their
investments would be required to satisfy the job-creation crite-.
rion; and (2) the Board could not enunciate through adjudicative
means a rule which is properly created through the regulatory
process.
In finding no adequate notice, the Ninth Circuit relied on
its earlier case, Ruangswang v. INS," wherein the court had reversed the Board and found that the dictum in Heitland gave
inadequate notice to Ruangswang since she had applied prior to
the Heitland decision.· t
In Bahat and Patel, the aliens made their investments in
1976, some two years after the Heitland decision. The Ninth
Circuit found, however, that since the rule as applied to the 1973
regulation was only dictum in Heitland, and was somewhat obscure and confusing at that, the rule failed to provide adequate
notice.
In Patel, the court fully developed its argument that application of the Heitland decision to the 1973 regulation circumvented the rulemaking procedure. The Patel court premised its
analysis on the fact that the Service as an agency had requested
the Heitland requirement at the time the 1973 regulation was
24.
25.
F.2d at
26.
27.
28.
29.

14 I. & N. Dec. at 567.
The term "job-creation criterion" is ODe coined by the court in Patel v. INS, 638
1204.
14 I. & N. Dec. at 566-67.
16 I. & N. Dec. 76 (1976).
591 F.2d 39 (9th Cu. 1978).
Id. at 45.
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proposed. The original Service proposal for the 1973 regulation
called for a minimum investment of $25,000 in an enterprise
"reasonably . . . expected to be of prospective benefit to the
economy of the United States and not intended solely to provide
a livelihood for the investor and his family."ao However, while
the Service normally proposed the dual requirements of a
$25,000 investment and an expansion of job opportunities, it instead promulgated the dual requirements of a $10,000 investment and one year's experience. Consequently the court found
that when the Board in Heitland grafted the job-creation criterion onto the 1973 regulation, it sought to do through the adjudicative process what the Service appeared unable to achieve
through the rulemaking process.
The Patel court found that the Board circumvented the
rulemaking procedure thereby abusing its discretion. In its finding, the Patel court relied primarily on NLRB u. WymanGordon Co.1l In Wyman-Gordon, the Supreme Court invalidated a rule created by the National Labor Relations Board in
an agency decision. 81 The Court concluded that the NLRB rule
was "an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect" and that the Administrative Procedure Act
(the APA) forbade its promulgation in an adjudicative proceeding. as The Ninth Circuit, in Patel, held that the Heitland rule as
applied to the 1973 regulation was similar to the NLRB rule in
Wyman-Gordon because "it was the prospective pronouncement
of a broad, generally applicable requirement, without application of the requirement to the parties"84 actually before the
Board.
The reasoning of the court in Patel and the results reached
in both decisions are significant for future immigration cases in
30. 37 Fed. Reg. 23,274 (1974), quoted in Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d at 1202.
31. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
32. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
33. Section 1 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides definitions to be followed in applying the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976). It defines adjudication 88 an "agency
process for the formulation of an order." 1d. § 551(7). An order is the "final disposition
... of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking." 1d. § 551(6). Rulemaking means an
"agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." 1d. § 551(5).
A rule is an "agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect." 1d. § 551(4). Thus, by tracing the definitions, it is evident that a statement of
future effect is a rule and therefore not allowed in an adjudicatory proceeding.
34. Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d at 1203.
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two important ways. First, Patel indicates a willingness on the
Ninth Circuit's part to look outside the immigration field for
guidance in immigration cases and to apply the AP A to the immigration field. All too often, immigration practioners presume
conclusively that the AP A does not apply to immigration cases.
While it is true that the AP A has been found inapplicable to
deportation and exclusion procedures,la in other ways the APA
can have a significant applicability in the immigration field, as
shown by this case. Ie
Second, the results reached in Bahat and Patel seem to indicate an unwillingness by the Ninth Circuit to accept the Service's attempts· to graft additional requirements onto statutes
and regulations. In this way, these cases are similar to the recent
decisions Palmer. v. Reddyl' and Dabaghian v. Civiletti." In
Palmer, the court held the Service requirement that a stepparent who petitions for her stepchild must show a "close family
unit" exceeded the statutory language of section lOl(b)(l)(B) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as it defines stepchild. Ie In
Dabaghian, the Service attempted to rescind the alien's permanent resident status on the ground that he was ineligible for status as the spouse of an American citizen. The court ruled that
the INS could not read into the word "spouse" a requirement
that the marriage be viable or subsisting.'0
Undoubtedly, the Service has wide discretion in determining new principles in an adjudicative proceeding. Nonetheless,
the agency must not use the adjudicative process to replace either the legislative or the regulatory process. Nor can an agency
announce a rule in the adjudicative process contrary to a statute
or regulation. In addition, Patel and Bahat indicate that in certain circumstances the court will find on the basis of inadequate
notice that an adjudicative rUle announced in one decision cannot be applied to other cases.
35. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). See generally 2 C. GORDON & E.
LAw AND PROCEDURE, § 8.12b, at 8·106 (1981).
36. See also Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
37. 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980).
38. 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979).
39. 622 F.2d at 464.
40. 607 F.2d at 871.

ROSEN·

PIBLD, IMMIGRATION
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CONCLUSION

The frustrations for immigration lawyers and aliens in dealing with the Service are great. The Service operates with a
shortage of personnel and under an internally contradictive and
antiquated statute while the aliens' rights and real options for
legal immigration are often severely limited. It is no wonder that
aliens are increasingly looking for means to bring their cases
before the courts. The Ninth Circuit, in cases like those discussed above, has opened the door slightly to aliens' complaints.
Immigration lawyers and aliens will certainly seek to push that
door open wider in future years. It is equally certain that the
Reagan administration intends to limit aliens' access to the federal court system. 41 The questions of the scope of judicial review
of Service actions and of the propriety of Service procedures are
ones which will be hotly debated in the next years both in the
legislative and judicial arenas.

II. UPDATE-TAPIA-ACUNA v.
CIRCUIT ADOPTS FRANCIS

INS:

THE

NINTH

In Tapia-Acuna v. INS,l the Ninth Circuit adopted the rationale of Francis v. INS,· in which the Second Circuit extended
section 212(c) relief to an alien who is otherwise deportable
under section 241(a)(11) and has not left the United States since
first immigrating. Petitioner Tapia-Acuna, a lawful permanent
resident alien, was convicted of possession of marijuana for sale.
Subsequently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act).8 Finding petitioner de41. Such proposals are found in S. 176588 proposed to the Senate. 127 CONGo
Sl1,996-97 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).

REC.

1. 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were
Goodwin, J. and Skelton, D.J., sitting by designation).
2. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
3. Section 241(a)(11) provides in pertinent part:
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported wh~
(11) is, or hereafter at any time after entry has been, a
narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of
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portable, the immigration judge denied his application for
section 212(c) relief.· Mter the Board of Immigration Appeals
(the BIA) affirmed, petitioner sought review in the Ninth
Circuit.
While his petition was pending in the Ninth Circuit, petitioner moved to reopen his case based on a state court order
expunging his conviction. The BIA denied petitioners request
based on recent Ninth Circuit decisions that found an alien who
is deportable under section 241(a)(1l) of the Act ineligible for
section 212(c) relief. Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
BIA denial, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and ordered
the Ninth Circ\lit to reconsider its position based on the Solicitor General's assertion that aliens deportable under section
241(a)(1l) are eligible for section 212(c) relief.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the fact that although section 212(c) refers only to grounds for exclusion, it has also been
readily applied to deportation proceedings. Past Ninth Circuit
decisions have denied the possibility of section 212(c) relief in
cases where the alien has not voluntarily departed from and returned to the United States.' A recent Second Circuit case, however, found such interpretations of section 212(c) violative of
due process. In Francis v. INS,' the Second Circuit faced a fact
situation similar to that in Tapia-Acuna. The Francis court
found that because section 212(c) relief is afforded to aliens who
depart and return to the United States, it should be equally
available to aliens who have remaine'd in the United States
a violation of . . . any law or regulation relating to the illicit
possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana, or who
has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation
governing or controlling . . . the sale . . . of opium, cocoa
leaves, berion, marihuana . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1976).
4. Section 212(c) provides that "[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence
who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportetion,
and who are returning to a lawfully unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years,
may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of [§§ 241(a)(l) to 241(a)(25)]." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
5. See Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975);
Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972). Section 212(c) relief requires that the
alien voluntarily depart and return to the United States. See note 4 supra for the relevant text of § 212(c).
6. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
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continuously.'
The Tapia-Acuna court further noted that the BIA has voluntarily adopted the Francis rationale and rejected the previous
distinction. 8 Several Ninth Circuit cases decided after Francis,
however, have continued to extend section 212(c) relief only to
aliens that have voluntarily departed and returned. 9 Rejecting
these earlier decisions as having "create[d] a distinction that
lacks a rational basis,"lo the Tapia-Acuna court adopted Francis and extended section 212(c) relief to an otherwise eligible
alien regardless of any prior departure and reentry to the United
States.
Tapia- Acuna ends a series of Ninth Circuit decisions which
. have distinguished cases on the basis of a totally irrelevant consideration. l l With Tapia-Acuna, the Ninth Circuit has caught
up with the Second Circuit and the BIA and reversed an unhealthy trend in this circuit.

7. ld. at 271-73.
8. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (1978); Matter of Hom, 16 I. & N.
Dec. 112, 113-14 (1977); Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 29-30 (1976).
9. Bowe v. INS, 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979); Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th
Cir. 1979).
10. 640 F.2d at 225.
11. For an exce\1ent discussion of this issue, see Hing, The Ninth Circuit: No Place
for Drug Offenders, 10 GOLDEN GATE V.L. REV. 1 (1980).
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